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Abstract 
This paper determines the market value of dividends in the UK during periods 
before and after 1997. Previous studies, which use the ex-dividend day method, 
tend to provide noisy and potentially biased measures of dividend value. We 
estimate the value of dividends from the prices of shares that are identical 
except for their dividend entitlements, and are traded concurrently (within the 
same hour). We argue that our estimates of dividend value are the cleanest yet 
available for the UK. Our evidence suggests that ex-dividend day estimates are 
biased downwards, but that this bias may be mitigated by the use of robust 
regression. Dividend values are heterogeneous and are not explained by the tax-
clientele hypothesis. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The standard method of estimating the market value of a dividend is to observe the fall in the 
share price on the relevant ex-dividend day. This fall can then be divided by the cash value of 
the dividend to arrive at the drop-off ratio or dividend-valuation ratio (DVR). Many, though 
not all, studies in the UK and USA report DVRs of less than one, but the interpretation of this 
finding has proved controversial.  
Recently, two studies have sought to infer the market value of dividends from the 
prices of two classes of share in the same company which trade concurrently and which are 
identical except for their entitlement to the next cash dividend payment. We call this the 
concurrent trades method. Walker and Partington (1999) use the fact that some shares in 
Australia can be traded both ex-dividend and cum-dividend concurrently, whilst Chu and 
Partington (2002) infer dividend values from the prices of fully paid new shares following 
certain rights issues in Australia in which the new shares are not entitled to the next dividend. 
Chu and Partington report mean DVRs considerably in excess of one and infer that dividend 
values are being set by long term investors. Their evidence suggests that these investors are 
tax-advantaged institutions which particularly benefit from the imputation tax credits attached 
to the dividends. The dividend values reported by Chu and Partington are materially greater 
than the values derived from traditional ex-dividend day studies in Australia.  
The present paper applies the concurrent trades method to a sample of UK rights issues 
in which the new shares are not entitled to the next dividend. The paper proceeds as follows. 
Section 2 discusses the ambiguities of interpretation of ex-dividend day evidence and reviews 
the findings of UK ex-day studies. These studies report DVRs of less than one, despite the 
facts that about half the listed shares are owned by institutions which paid little or no tax on 
dividends, and that pension funds could reclaim imputation tax credits before July 1997. 
Section 3 presents the concurrent trades method and argues that it should provide less noisy 
and, potentially, less biased estimates of the market value of dividends.  
The results are presented in Section 4. We consider observations from before and after 
1997, when the cash refund of imputation credits for pension funds was withdrawn. We 
provide results from samples using the concurrent trades method and from the same samples 
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using the traditional ex-dividend day method. As the concurrent trades samples are quite 
small, we also report ex-dividend results from separate, much larger, samples from before and 
after 1997.  
The concurrent trades DVRs are considerably less noisy than the DVRs using the ex-
dividend method. The sample-wide concurrent trades DVR is greater than one on most 
measures, which differs from the traditional ex-day results that we present and from previous 
ex-day estimates of DVRs in the UK. A sample DVR of greater than one suggests that many 
dividends are valued gross of personal tax, and suggests a more important role for tax-
privileged institutions in the determination of market values than do ex-dividend day studies. 
As a result of our findings, we suggest that ex-day evidence may provide estimates of dividend 
value which are biased downwards, and that the bias is alleviated by the use of robust 
regression. There is little evidence of a change in the DVR after 1997, and we find no 
evidence of tax-clientele effects. Section 5 concludes the paper.  
 
2. THE VALUE OF DIVIDENDS AFTER PERSONAL TAX 
(i) Ex-dividend day studies 
We begin by considering a risk-neutral world without taxes or transaction costs. In such a 
world, the market value of a dividend should be equal to the cash value. The mean drop in 
share price when a share goes ex-dividend, which is an estimate of the market value, should 
equal the cash value of the dividend paid on that share. There will be variation around the 
mean because the share price can change on the ex-day due to the arrival of new information, 
but the mean should be close to one in a large sample.  
However, a considerable number of US empirical studies show that the DVR is 
consistently less than one. Elton and Gruber (1970) argue that this finding arises because 
dividends are taxed more heavily than capital gains. They argue that the DVR from ex-
dividend day evidence,  (Pcum − Pex)/D, is determined by  
 (Pcum − Pex)/D  =  (1 − TI)/(1 − TG) (1) 
where Pcum is the price at the close of the day before the ex-date, Pex is the price at the close of 
the ex-date, D is the dividend per share before personal tax, TI is the income tax rate of the 
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marginal investor in the relevant share, and TG is the marginal investor’s CGT rate. 
Empirically, Elton and Gruber find that the mean DVR is less than one and is positively 
related to dividend yield. This has been interpreted as evidence for the existence of tax 
clienteles in share ownership: high-yield shares, it is argued, tend to be held by investors 
paying relatively low rates of income tax, and vice versa for low-yield shares. 
One problem with the above tax-based explanation for observed DVRs is that there are 
near-arbitrage opportunities for any investor with personal tax rates giving a ratio (1 − TI)/(1 − 
TG) which is different from that obtained by substituting the dividend and observed price drop 
in equation (1). For example, if the fall in price is less than the value of the dividend, resulting 
in a DVR less than one, then a tax-exempt investor, or an investor equally taxed on dividends 
and capital gains, could expect to gain by buying the share the day before the ex-date, selling 
on the ex-date and receiving the dividend. Of course, the return would be net of transactions 
costs and a gain is not guaranteed since the ex-day price is not known in advance. 
Furthermore, the strategy potentially involves a temporary increase in the risk of the investor’s 
portfolio because of sub-optimal diversification. But trading volumes in the USA around ex-
dividend days are much larger than usual, which suggests that trading to exploit near-arbitrage 
opportunities does take place. 
If, before transactions costs, the equilibrium DVR is one1 for investors who are 
seeking to exploit arbitrage opportunities, then the observed DVR will be given by (D − C)/D, 
where C is the transactions costs of the requisite trades. Thus, a DVR of less than one could be 
driven by the transactions costs of short-term dividend-capture trading rather than by a tax 
disadvantage to dividends (see Allen and Michaely, 1995). Given that the absolute value of 
transactions costs is a positive function of share price, the impact of transactions costs on 
dividend values is less important for shares with high dividend yields than for shares with low 
dividend yields. Consequently, if arbitrageurs set prices about the ex-dividend date, 
transaction costs should result in DVRs which are positively related to dividend yields. 
Some more recent papers examine market microstructure effects, and cast further 
                                                          
1 An equilibrium DVR of one, before transactions costs, applies to tax-exempt investors and to 
investors who are equally taxed on dividends and capital gains. 
 
 
 5 
doubt on the use of ex-dividend day DVRs as a clean measure of dividend value. Bali and Hite 
(1998) examine the effect of tick size. For share prices above $1, the tick size on the New 
York Stock Exchange was 12.5 cents until 1997 (the minimum tick size had been reduced to 
one cent by 2001). The minimum tick size of 12.5 cents meant that the share prices could not 
change by the exact amount of the dividend, unless the dividend was a multiple of the tick 
size. Bali and Hite’s work suggests that the result was a downward bias in the DVR which 
became less severe as the size of the dividend increased. Hence a positive relation is predicted 
between DVR and the size of dividend. Since the size of the dividend and dividend yield are 
positively related, the tick effect also predicts a positive relation between the DVR and 
dividend yield. However Graham et al (2003) cast doubt on Bali and Hite’s tick size effect. 
Graham et al examine the effect of decimalisation on ex-dividend price movements on the 
New York Stock Exchange and find that abnormal ex-dividend day returns increased with the 
introduction of decimalisation. This implies that DVRs decreased as the tick size was reduced. 
This is the direct opposite of the prediction from Bali and Hite’s argument, which is that 
DVRs should have increased as tick sizes were reduced. The significance of the tick size 
effect is therefore debatable. In any event, it seems unlikely that the tick size effect will be 
important in the UK market, since tick sizes in the UK are small. 
Frank and Jagannathan (1998) find that the DVR in Hong Kong was significantly less 
than one despite an absence of taxes on dividends and capital gains. They suggest that bid-ask 
bounce and transactions costs explain their result. In their model, investor aversion to the cost 
of handling dividends leads to selling pressure cum-dividend and buying pressure ex-dividend, 
so cum-dividend trades are more likely to be at the bid and ex-dividend trades are more likely 
to be at the ask, thus narrowing the observed ex-day price drop. They argue that this effect will 
be stronger for smaller dividends, which have higher handling costs per dollar of dividend. 
This potential arbitrage opportunity in Hong Kong disappeared after the introduction of 
electronic settlement, which reduced the holding period for an ex-dividend arbitrage from 
twenty-one days to less than one day. Kadapakkam (2000) shows that after the introduction of 
electronic settlement in Hong Kong in 1993, the DVR was not significantly different from one. 
So it appears that long holding periods inhibit ex-day arbitrage. 
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Lasfer (1995) also provides evidence that settlement arrangements can potentially 
affect DVRs. Before 18 July 1994, the London Stock Exchange operated a fixed settlement-
date system in which the year was divided into account-settlement periods of either two or 
three weeks. Under this system, investors could hold shares for at least two weeks prior to 
payment on settlement day, and several authors have identified positive abnormal returns on 
the first day of the account, which may reflect this financing advantage. A large majority of 
shares went ex-dividend on the first day of the account period, and in these cases, an investor 
purchasing a share on the cum-dividend day could be required to settle the transaction at least 
two weeks earlier than if he purchased on the ex-dividend day. Adjustment for the time value 
of the difference in settlement dates reduces the ex-day price in relation to the last cum-
dividend price, and hence shifts a DVR below one nearer to one.  
In summary, the tax-clientele view predicts (i) that the DVRs should be less than one 
on average and (ii) that DVR and dividend yield should be positively related. However, the 
same results could arise if prices are set by dividend-capture traders subject to transaction 
costs. There are three other possible explanations for DVRs of less than one based on 
transactions costs and market microstructure, namely the tick effect, bid-ask spread effect, and 
the effect of the settlement period. Of these the tick and bid-ask spread effects predict a 
positive relation between DVR and yield, assuming that dividend size and yield are positively 
related. 
 
(ii) An equilibrium with heterogeneous marginal traders 
A framework for analysing the market value of dividends, in a similar setting to our study, has 
recently been presented by Chu and Partington (2002). Their analysis is akin to that of Boyd 
and Jagannathan (1994). It assumes a context in which it is possible to trade, over an extended 
period, two classes of share in the same company which are identical except in their 
entitlement to the next dividend. The analysis distinguishes between traders who are acting as 
investors and traders who are acting as arbitrageurs. An investor is someone who has decided 
to trade the share for reasons unconnected with the next dividend. The decision he or she faces 
is then whether to trade the share entitled to the dividend, or to trade the unentitled share. The 
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investor makes the decision by comparing his or her personal after-tax value of the dividend 
with the market value of the dividend, measured by the difference between the prices of the 
two classes of share. Transactions costs are not a significant consideration for an investor 
since they will be incurred irrespective of whether the investor chooses to trade in the share 
entitled to the dividend, or the unentitled share.2 Let us ignore capital gains tax for the 
moment. Suppose, for example, that the market value of the dividend on share i is the same as 
the cash value, but that an investor wishing to buy the share would pay some income tax on i’s 
dividend. Then the investor will choose to buy the unentitled class of share i, because the price 
of the entitled share incorporates a value for the dividend which exceeds its after-tax value to 
this particular investor. 
 Arbitrageurs, or short-term traders, are agents who trade concurrently in the two 
classes of the share to exploit a difference between the market value of a dividend and its 
value to the arbitrageur. The value of a dividend to an arbitrageur is determined not only by 
the arbitrageur’s tax position, but also by the transactions costs of conducting the arbitrage, 
which include the bid-ask spread. The transactions cost disadvantage means that arbitrageurs 
will only be able to compete in the market if they have a tax advantage over the marginal 
investors.   
In this analysis, the market value of the dividend on share i is its after-tax value to the 
marginal buyer or seller. Chu and Partington (2002) argue that tax-advantaged pension funds 
acting as investors are likely to be the marginal, price-setting traders. They will attach a higher 
value to dividends than will arbitrageurs, for whom transactions costs are relevant. If this is 
the case, the DVR is invariant with respect to the dividend yield. Transactions costs do not 
affect dividend value, and since the marginal trader represents only one class of investor, there 
is no clientele effect. Consequently, no relationship is expected between the DVR and 
dividend yield. However, Chu and Partington acknowledge that pension funds might not be 
trading at the margin in all stocks at all times. Therefore, it is possible that investors across 
                                                          
2 A small effect arises if transactions costs are assumed to be proportional to price, since the 
price of the unentitled share will be lower than the price of the entitled share. If transactions 
costs are modelled as a fixed cost they drop out of the equilibrium pricing conditions. 
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different shares and different trading times might not all be in the same tax bracket. In this 
case DVRs could differ across shares in an unsystematic fashion. But there is no reason to 
expect a systematic relation between DVR and dividend yield. The key difference between the 
above analysis and the tax-clientele view is the prediction that a pension fund is likely to be 
the price-setting trader for any share. Whereas in the tax-clientele view, the tax-advantaged 
investors such as pension funds set the prices for high yield shares. 
If capital gains tax (CGT) is introduced, the after-tax value of a dividend to both buyer 
and seller rises. This is because the CGT benefit from the ex-dividend price drop reduces the 
after-tax cost of receiving the dividend, ie the price drop. Under a classical tax system, the 
DVR allowing for CGT is D(1 − TI)/(1 − TG), as in equation (1) (this ignores the second-order 
effect of any difference between the dates on which income tax and CGT are paid). Chu and 
Partington show that, with CGT, the after-tax value of a dividend can differ according to 
whether the investor is a buyer or a seller of the share. But the difference will not be large, and 
there is still no relation predicted between the DVR and dividend yield. 
 There are two main inferences from the above analysis. First, DVRs may vary across 
dividends depending on the tax position of the marginal trader, and on whether he or she is 
trading as an investor or as an arbitrageur. Second, if tax-advantaged long term investors 
determine dividend values, as expected, there will be no systematic relation between DVR and 
the size of the dividend or the dividend yield. But if arbitrageurs determine dividend values 
there will be a positive relation between the DVR and dividend yield driven by the 
transactions costs of arbitrage.  
 
(iii) UK taxes and evidence on dividend value  
Under the version of the imputation system which prevailed in the UK during 1973-97, 
companies paid dividends to shareholders net of advance corporation tax (ACT) which they 
paid direct to the Inland Revenue. Thus the relationship between the gross and net dividend is 
defined as Dnet  =  Dgross(1 − TACT), where TACT is the ACT rate. In UK studies, the cash value 
of the dividend is regarded as the net dividend, after ACT has been paid. The ACT rate varied 
in a range between a high of 35% in 1976 and a low of 20% during 1993-97; for most of the 
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period it was equal to the basic rate of income tax. ACT counted both as part of the 
corporation tax on the profit paid out as dividend, and as all or part of the income tax on the 
dividend.  
A shareholder paying income tax at the basic rate was not liable to any tax on the net 
dividend he received. A shareholder paying income tax at a higher rate was liable to additional 
income tax, at a rate on the net dividend such that the ACT plus the additional tax was equal 
to a payment at the higher rate of income tax on the gross dividend. A tax-exempt shareholder 
could reclaim from the Inland Revenue all of the ACT paid by the company.  
The statutory rate of tax on capital gains was 30% up to 1988, when the statutory rates 
of income tax and CGT were equalised. But various provisions meant that the effective rate on 
capital gains was zero or much lower than the statutory rates for many investors. Tax-exempt 
shareholders paid no CGT. Because they paid no tax on the net dividend and could also 
recover the ACT, there was a clear tax advantage to dividends for tax-exempt shareholders. 
But in July 1997, the provision whereby pension funds could reclaim ACT was discontinued. 
The rate of ACT was cut from 20% to 10% in 1999 and the credit was discontinued altogether 
in 2004. 
During the 1980s and 1990s about one-third of listed equity was owned by pension 
funds and charities, which were entirely exempt from tax on their investments. A further 15% 
was owned by life assurance funds which were not exempt but which in practice paid little 
personal tax, and could reclaim ACT. This arose because, in calculating their taxable income 
on investment, life assurance funds could offset their operating expenses against the income 
(see MacLeod and Levitt, 1999, for detail on the taxation of life offices). Ownership of UK 
shares by foreign institutions was growing and had reached 17% by 1995. Foreign institutions 
either received dividends net and paid no further UK tax, or were allowed a partial refund of 
ACT, depending on the relevant double-taxation treaty. For a more detailed discussion of the 
taxation of share returns in the UK and of share ownership by category of investor, see 
Armitage (2004) or Bell and Jenkinson (2002). 
 Table 1 shows the after-tax value of dividends by category of investor during 1988-93, 
the main period analysed in this paper. It can be seen that, if CGT is ignored, the only category 
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of investor which valued a dividend at less than the net dividend (ie, DVR < 1) was 
individuals paying income tax at the highest rate of 40%. If it is assumed that investors paid 
CGT at the maximum relevant rate, then all categories except foreign investors had a DVR of 
at least 1.33.  
 
Table 1 around here 
 
As might be expected from the discussion in Section 2(i), the evidence on dividend 
values after tax from existing UK ex-dividend studies is inconclusive, and indeed puzzling. 
Menyah (1993) reports mean DVRs for the 1960s and 70s which are below 0.5. Bell and 
Jenkinson (2002), Asimakopoulos and Hodgkinson (2001), Lasfer (1995, 1996), Crossland et 
al (1991) and Davidson and Mallin (1989) use data from the 1980s and 1990s. They find that, 
on average, the fall in price on the ex-day remains considerably smaller than the face value of 
net dividends; the mean full-sample DVRs reported range between 0.5 to 0.9 (if the face value 
of the dividend is viewed as the gross value, before subtracting ACT, the mean DVRs are in 
the region of 0.4 to 0.7). Lasfer’s (1995) adjustment for the time value of different settlement 
dates increases the mean DVR by about 0.25, but his adjusted means are still slightly less than 
one. Menyah argues that no adjustment should be made, since settlement of trades in the last 
two days of an account period could be deferred to the end of the next period. Hodgkinson and 
Asimakopoulos incorporate adjustments both for settlement dates and for the bid-ask spread 
effect, but again their adjusted mean DVR is just below one. Thus, it might appear that the 
market value of dividends is, if anything, less than the cash value net of personal tax at the 
ACT rate, despite the fact that about half of listed shares were owned by institutions (pension 
funds, life funds and charities) which paid little or no tax and could reclaim some or all of the 
ACT. 
In some cases the null hypothesis that the DVR was equal to one could not be rejected. 
However as Davidson and Mallin observe there are severe problems of  noise and outliers in 
ex-dividend data. One consequence of this is likely to be low power statistical tests which 
make it difficult to reject the null hypothesis. Another consequence of these problems is that 
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they make results sensitive to filtering of the sample and the estimation method used. In order 
to deal with the effect of outliers, Davidson and Mallin suggest that robust regression methods 
be used. They find that this results in higher DVR estimates, some in excess of one. 
Menyah (1993) and Lasfer (1995, 1996) find no evidence of arbitrageur trading around 
ex-dividend days from trading volumes, or from abnormal returns, in the few days before and 
after ex-days. They suggest that provisions introduced in 1970 to reduce tax avoidance may 
have prevented investors and security dealers from taking full advantage of the apparent near-
arbitrage. For example, if a tax-exempt investor attempted dividend-capture trading, he or she 
could have become liable to tax. He would not have been able to claim all the tax credit on the 
dividend, Dnet[TACT/(1 − TACT)], but only N/30 of the credit, where N is the number of days for 
which the share is held. However, it is not certain how effectively the anti-avoidance 
provisions were applied. 
Menyah’s (1993) and Lasfer’s (1995, 1996) evidence is not only inconsistent with 
arbitrage trading, it is also inconsistent with the view that tax clienteles value dividends net of 
personal tax. Menyah finds no relation between DVR and dividend yield in the 1960s or 70s. 
Lasfer examines the ex-day abnormal return, which includes the cash value of the dividend. 
For the periods 1980-83 and 1985-93, he reports a positive relation between ex-day abnormal 
return and yield, which implies a negative relation between DVR and yield. Bell and 
Jenkinson (2002), on the other hand, present weak evidence of a positive relation between 
DVR and yield during 1995-99. It is not clear why the results from these papers differ, but a 
finding of no relation, or a negative relation, between DVR and yield is not consistent with the 
tax-clientele view and is difficult to square with the inference that dividends are valued net of 
personal tax. 
The evidence from studies of changes in tax policy is also ambiguous, although it does 
suggest that ‘tax matters’. There have been five major changes in the taxation of equity in the 
last 50 years, in 1952, 1958, 1965, 1973 and 1997, and many minor changes. Poterba and 
Summers (1985) examine dividend policy before and after the first four of the major changes, 
and generally find that they affected dividend values and pay-out policy. For example, the re-
introduction of an imputation system in 1973 substantially increased the after-tax value of 
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dividends for all categories of investors, but did not affect CGT. Even tax-exempt investors 
benefited, because they could start to reclaim ACT. These authors find that DVRs rose after 
1973, and that dividend pay-out ratios rose, which can be interpreted as a response by 
companies to the increased after-tax value of dividends in relation to capital gains.  
In 1988, rates of income tax above 40%, paid by individuals, were abolished, and the 
statutory rates of income tax and CGT were equalised. As a consequence, the highest rate of 
personal tax on dividends became equal to the CGT rate, and dividends became more 
attractive to individuals who had been paying tax at rates above 40%. Lasfer (1995) finds that 
DVRs increased marginally after 1988 and attributes this to the change in taxes affecting 
individual investors. He argues that high-taxpaying individuals affected the market value of 
dividends, which supports the view that the anti-avoidance provisions were effective. In 
contrast, Bell and Jenkinson (2002) argue that pension funds affected the market value of 
dividends for the highest-yielding shares. They find that the mean DVR fell significantly after 
July 1997 for the highest-yielding quintile of shares, from 1.14 to 0.95. Since the 1997 change 
only affected pension funds, they infer that trading by pension funds affects the prices of high-
yielding shares around ex-dividend dates. However, they also report a significant fall in the 
mean DVR for the middle quintile of shares by yield, from 0.93 to 0.72. If this fall is 
explained by price-setting by pension funds, why is the pre-97 DVR not substantially greater 
than one?  
To summarise the UK ex-dividend day evidence, from the 1960s onwards, sample 
means of DVRs have consistently been found to be below one. If this finding is ascribed to the 
effect of personal tax, it implies that dividends have been valued net of personal tax at the 
ACT rate and net of some additional higher rate income tax; that effective CGT rates have 
been small; and that most dividend values have been set by investors paying income tax. The 
latter inference seems strange for recent decades, in which share ownership and trading has 
been dominated by institutional investors which either received dividends net of ACT, or 
could reclaim some or all of the ACT. Furthermore, there is no clear relation between DVR 
and dividend yield, and DVRs were apparently affected by the change in 1997, which only 
affected tax-exempt pension funds. These latter findings are difficult to explain if dividend 
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values are set by taxpaying investors. 
It is apparent from the above review that the evidence on DVRs from UK ex-dividend 
studies is hard to interpret. We now explain the concurrent trades method of estimating 
dividend value, and why we expect it to provide more precise estimates than traditional ex-
dividend studies. 
 
3. DATA AND METHOD 
(i) Concurrent trades method 
The concurrent trades method provides explicit estimates of dividend values after tax. It 
exploits the fact that, during and after some rights issues, two classes of share in the same 
company are traded concurrently and are identical except that one class is not entitled to the 
next dividend payment. The market value of the dividend can be inferred by comparing the 
market prices of the two classes of share.  
In a rights issue, the new shares are offered to shareholders pro rata to their existing 
holdings. They are issued ‘nil-paid’ at the start of the offer period in the form of provisional 
allotment letters (PALs) which accompany the prospectus. The shares go ex-rights the day 
after the offer starts, which means that they no longer carry the right to purchase new shares. 
The nil-paid PALs or rights can be traded during the offer period in the same way as the 
existing shares are traded. If a shareholder wants to buy some of the shares he has been offered 
and to sell the rights to the remainder, his PAL can be ‘split’ accordingly. The closing date of 
the offer is the last date for acceptance and payment for the new shares, and must be at least 
three weeks after the announcement date. The day before the close, dealings in rights 
commence for fully paid settlement. The new shares are identical to the existing shares, unless 
there is a dividend to which the new shares do not carry entitlement, and the relevant ex-
dividend date falls some time after the ex-rights date. If these circumstances apply, both the 
price of the new shares nil-paid and the price of the new shares fully paid are affected by the 
absence of entitlement until the next ex-dividend date, and effectively two classes of share are 
traded. On the next ex-dividend date there ceases to be any distinction between the new and 
old shares.  
 
 
 14 
Pre-1997 sample. We identified 212 rights issues during the five fiscal years 6 April 
1988 to 5 April 1993 in which the new shares were not entitled to the next dividend. There 
were no material changes in the tax regime during this period. We could not use 127 of the 
issues because the relevant ex-dividend date preceded the ex-rights date. Of the remainder, we 
could not find at least one pair of concurrent trades, or ex-dividend prices, for 23 issues.3 We 
excluded one issue because the next dividend was only 0.1p and two issues which had 
dividends less than one penny and dividend yields of less than half of one percent. With such 
small dividends coupled with small yields, extreme estimates of dividend value are likely to 
arise as a consequence of measurement errors of small absolute value. Our final sample 
consists of trades following 59 rights issues. 
We use trade-by-trade prices and match the prices as closely as possible by the intraday 
times of the trades. Prices and times of trades in the existing shares, the new shares nil-paid 
(rights) and the new shares fully paid were obtained from the Stock Exchange Daily Official 
List (SEDOL). There is a SEDOL ‘book’ for every trading day, in which details of all the 
trades of shares listed on the London Stock Exchange are recorded. The trades are listed by the 
hour in SEDOL, so we are able to identify when trades took place within one hour of each 
other. The prices we use are averages of the prices of the trades observed within each hour: 
 
∑= t
t
t Pold
n
Pold 1
 (2)
 
∑= t
t
t Pnil
n
Pnil 1
 (3)
 
∑= t
t
t Pnew
n
Pnew 1
 (4)
 
where Poldt is the observed price of a trade in the existing (old) shares of a given company at 
hour t, Pnilt is the price of the nil-paid shares, Pnewt is the price of the new shares from the 
date for fully paid settlement, and nt is the number of trades in the share during hour t. A price 
is only included if both classes of share were traded at least once in a given hour; if there was 
a trade in one class of share but not the other, the price is ignored.  
                                                          
3 We required the ex-dividend prices to construct a sample matched to the concurrent trades 
sample, in order to value the dividends using the ex-dividend method. 
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The resulting sample contains 2,551 pairs of prices following the 59 rights issues. 
With nil-paid shares, the difference in price between the old and new shares for hour t is 
estimated as: 
 
)( PofferPnilPoldDiff ttt +−=  (5) 
where Difft is the price difference and Poffer is the offer price per share for the new shares. 
With fully paid shares, the price difference is simply: 
 
ttt PnewPoldDiff −=  (6) 
Strictly speaking, the present values of the share price and offer price should be used in the 
above equations, and Difft should be compared with the discounted value of the next dividend. 
However, as the time lags are short, we work with unadjusted offer prices and dividends. 
Since the offer price would tend to be paid later than the price of the existing shares (though 
not always, because of the fixed-date settlement periods), the present-value adjustment would 
probably increase the estimated market value of the dividend. Discounting would definitely 
reduce the face value of the next dividend. Hence, our DVR estimates would almost certainly 
be larger were we to make the present-value adjustments. The same comment applies to the 
results of ex-dividend day studies, none of which, to our knowledge, adjust for the lag 
between the ex-day and actual receipt of the dividend. 
There are two ways to arrive at a sample of paired prices. One way is to treat the 2,551 
paired prices as observations, but this sample will not have been selected independently from 
the population of potential paired prices. Shares that are relatively liquid and trade frequently, 
and shares for which there is a longer period of time between the ex-rights day and the ex-
dividend day, are more heavily weighted. To avoid this problem, we calculate a price 
difference for each rights issue, and treat this as one observation in our statistical tests. The 
price difference for a given rights issue is computed as the average of the hourly price 
differences for the whole of the trading period in the relevant share: 
  
∑= tDiffnhoursDiff
1
 (7)
 
where nhours is the number of hours in which there was at least one trade in each class of 
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share. With each rights issue treated as an observation, each DVR is given by: 
 
D
DiffDVR =
 (8)
 
With each hourly price difference treated as an observation, each DVR is given by: 
 
D
DiffDVR tt =
 (9)
 
 Post-1997 sample. In July 1997 pension funds ceased to be able to reclaim ACT from 
the Inland Revenue. In order to assess the impact of this policy change, we attempted to gather 
a post-1997 sample. It seems that the practice of issuing new shares with a different dividend 
entitlement from the old shares has become more unusual in recent years, as have rights issues 
themselves. We checked the prospectuses of 142 rights issues during 1 July 1998 to 31 March 
2004 and only 19 had new shares not entitled to the next dividend, together with an ex-date 
after the ex-rights date. We could not find concurrent trades, or ex-dividend prices, for five of 
these issues. Consequently the post-97 sample consists of only 14 issues, but with 1,252 
matched pairs of prices.  
 
(ii) Comparison with ex-dividend day evidence 
Using the ex-dividend day method we compute the value of dividends for the concurrent 
trades sample, which allows a direct comparison of the two methods. As the resulting 
estimates for this matched sample cover only a small number of ex-dividend events, we also 
report ex-dividend day results for a much larger unmatched ex-dividend sample, of 4,046 
dividends during 6 April 1988 to 5 April 1993 and 1,814 dividends during 27 March 1998 to 
31 December 1999. Prices used in the ex-dividend analysis were mid-point closing prices 
extracted from Datastream and Extel. 
 We argue that the concurrent trades method should provide estimates of the market 
value of dividends which will be more accurate than those from ex-dividend day studies. The 
concurrent trade measurements are likely to be less noisy and should also alleviate the biases 
due to time lags and market microstructure effects discussed in Section 2(i). The estimates are 
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likely to be less noisy because the concurrent trades method enables the market value of a 
given dividend to be estimated from repeated observations of time-matched trades of shares 
with different entitlements to the next dividend. The number of observations can be as large as 
a few hundred. The ex-dividend method only provides one estimate of market value per 
dividend. In addition, the ex-dividend studies referred to in Section 2(iii) use market-makers’ 
mid-point prices at the close of the market each day, so the lag between observations of cum-
dividend and ex-dividend prices is at least twenty-four hours. Due to infrequent trading, some 
shares will have a longer gap between cum and ex-dividend prices which reflect actual trades 
(the proportion is 8.6% in the sample of Bell and Jenkinson, 2002). However, using the 
concurrent trade method the lag between one price and its pair can be no more than an hour. 
We would also expect the concurrent trades method to avoid the potential tick size bias 
in an ex-day study. This can be seen by considering how a tax-exempt arbitrageur might 
exploit the difference in price between an old share and a new share not entitled to the next 
dividend. Suppose the price of the old share is 100p, the tick size is 1p and the next dividend 
is 2.5p. If the price of the new share is 98p, there is a pure arbitrage gain of 0.5p per share 
available by buying the old share, selling short the new share, capturing the dividend and 
closing out the position on the ex-day. On the other hand, if the price of the new share is 97p, 
a pure arbitrage gain of 0.5p can also be made, by buying the new share and selling short the 
old share. On the ex-day, both shares become identical, and the arbitrageur receives 3.0p, 
whatever the share price, which exceeds the cash value of the dividend by 0.5p. A pure 
arbitrage gain is possible whether the price is 98p or 97p, or generally, whether the market 
value of the dividend is the cash value rounded down or rounded up to an exact multiple of 
ticks. Thus, although the presence of discrete price movements will be a source of noise in the 
inferred market value of a dividend, there is no reason to expect the tick effect to cause bias 
with the concurrent trades method.  
The concurrent trades method also avoids bias due to the fixed-date settlement periods. 
This could arise in an ex-day study using pre-1994 data because of the preponderance of ex-
dividend days on the first Monday of an account. Concurrent trades are spread across the week 
rather than being clustered on Mondays. In addition, as trades are spread through time rather 
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than being concentrated on the ex-date and the preceding trading day, systematic bias due to 
bid-ask spread effects is much less likely. However, the estimates from the concurrent trades 
method are still subject to noise from random shifts between bid and ask prices. 
 
4. RESULTS 
(i) Summary statistics and hypothesis tests 
Summary statistics for dividends, yields and DVRs are shown in Table 2, and Table 3 reports 
the results of tests of whether mean DVRs are equal to 1.00 and of whether mean DVRs for 
the different samples and methods are equal to each other. We do not report any hypothesis 
tests using the concurrent data by individual trades, as it is questionable whether the DVRs by 
individual trades are independent estimates. 
  
Tables 2 and 3 around here 
 
 Pre-1997 results. Panel A of Table 2 shows statistics for the pre-97 samples. Taking 
the concurrent trades sample, the mean DVR for the 59 issues is 1.08 (median 1.16), and the 
mean DVR for the 2,551 matched trades is 1.25 (median 1.38). However, these sample means 
are not significantly different from one (Table 3, Panel A.) In contrast, the mean DVR for 
exactly the same companies and dividend payments but using the ex-dividend method is only 
0.43 (median 0.42) and this sample mean is significantly less than one (Table 3. Panel A.)  
The difference between the concurrent trades mean DVR by issue and the ex-dividend 
day matched sample mean is significant at the 5% level using the t-test, and at the 1% level 
using the non-parametric Mann-Whitney test (Table 3, Panel B). If it is accepted that the 
concurrent trades method provides more precise estimates of DVR, this result suggests that 
DVRs from ex-dividend day studies have been understated.4 The mean DVR for the, much 
                                                          
4 In the matched ex-dividend sample, the ex-dividend day is preceded by a rights issue, and 
this might have caused the returns from this sample to be atypical in relation to returns around 
other ex-days. As a check, we calculated raw and abnormal returns for seven days, centred on 
the ex-day. The abnormal returns are estimated using the market model. The only day on 
which the average abnormal return is significantly different from zero is the ex-day, for which 
it is 1.42% (raw) and 1.38% (abnormal). A positive abnormal return is expected on the ex-day, 
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larger, unmatched ex-dividend sample is 0.95 (0.88), which is at the upper end of the range of 
estimates in previous UK studies. The unmatched sample mean is significantly below one 
according to the Mann-Whitney test, but not according to the t-test. Similarly, the difference 
between the concurrent trades mean of 1.08 and the unmatched ex-dividend mean of 0.95 is 
significant according to the Mann-Whitney test, but not according to the t-test.  
 The mean dividend yield of the unmatched sample is 1.79% (median 1.60%), 
somewhat below the mean yield of 2.11% (median 1.92%) of the concurrent trades sample. If 
there is a positive relation between DVR and yield, this could help explain the larger DVR 
found for the rights sample, though it would still leave unexplained the low DVR for the 
matched ex-dividend sample. However, we do not find a relation between DVR and yield, as 
discussed below. 
 It is also apparent in both panels of Table 2, that the estimates of DVR using the ex-
dividend method are much noisier than the concurrent trade estimates. The standard deviation 
of the DVRs by concurrent trades for 1988-93 is 0.53, compared with a standard deviation of 
ex-dividend DVRs of 2.07 for the matched sample and 5.51 for the unmatched sample. This 
supports our prediction that the concurrent trades method should provide more precise 
estimates of dividend values. 
A full list of the concurrent trades sample is provided in the Appendix. It shows, by 
company, the number of pairs of trades, the mean DVR and the standard error for each issue. 
The data suggest heterogeneous valuation of dividends across stocks. There is considerable 
variation across relatively precise DVRs from before and after 1997. For example a dividend 
of 9.90p for Bass has a DVR of 1.80, based on 494 observations and a standard error of 0.02; 
a 2.50p dividend for Granada Group has a DVR of 1.10 based on 189 observations with a 
standard error of 0.05; and a 2.80p dividend for Tootal has a DVR of 0.26 based on 52 
observations with a standard error of 0.06. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
given a drop-off ratio less than one. We conclude that there is no sign of unusual returns 
around the ex-day for the matched sample.  The results are available from the authors on 
request. 
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Given the relative precision of many estimates, the variation in DVRs is not readily 
explained away as purely sampling error. We note, however, that some of the variation in 
DVRs is due to noise, particularly for cases with small dividend yields. Logica, for example, 
with a DVR of 6.30, has a dividend of 1.90p, but the dividend yield is only 0.098%. With the 
dividend value being such a small fraction of the share price, the measurement of dividend 
value is easily confounded by other factors such as bid-ask spread. 
 Post-1997 results. Panel B of Table 2 reports summary statistics for the post-1997 
samples. For the concurrent trades sample, the mean DVR across the 14 issues is 1.61 (median 
1.13), and the mean DVR across the 1,252 matched trades is 2.51 (median 1.31). Compared to 
the pre-1997 concurrent trades results, the means are larger, but the medians are slightly 
smaller. However, none of these differences is statistically significant (Table 3, Panel C.) The 
mean DVR using the ex-dividend day matched sample is lower post-1997, at 0.24 (median 
1.04), but again the difference is not significant.  
 Given the elimination of cash refunds of ACT for pension funds, it is surprising that 
there is no evidence of a fall in DVR post 1997. Clearly the post-97 sample is small, measured 
by number of issues, and the result could be dismissed as unrepresentative due to the small 
sample size. On the other hand, the concurrent trades result is based on 1,252 separate 
observations of pairs of trades. For several shares (6 out of the 14), the DVR per issue (the 
mean of the pairs of trades for that issue) is based on relatively large samples of 50 or more 
matched pairs. The DVRs for the majority of shares are estimated with relatively little noise, 
and the means are more than two standard errors above one for 8 of the 14 observations post 
1997.  
The mean DVR for the unmatched ex-dividend day sample post 1997 is 0.60 (median 
0.86) but it is not significantly different from the mean of the unmatched pre-1997 ex-
dividend sample. Thus, the concurrent trades sample, the matched ex-dividend sample and the 
unmatched ex-dividend sample consistently fail to provide significant evidence of a change in 
DVRs post 1997.  
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(ii) Estimates of DVR from regression 
The regression approach adopted in some ex-dividend studies regresses the ex-day price drop 
divided by the share price on the dividend yield (Boyd and Jagannathan, 1994; Bell and 
Jenkinson, 2002). The slope coefficient of this regression provides an estimate of the marginal 
DVR. The reason for running the regression in this scaled form is that errors in the ex-day 
market value of dividends tend to be heteroscedastic, being greater for small dividends, so that 
taking the raw (unweighted) dividend gives more weight to the values of small dividends. 
Dividing by the share price alleviates the heteroscedasticity, though it introduces a potential 
bias by giving more weight to high-yielding shares. It is not clear that dividing through by the 
share price is required for the concurrent trades values by issue, since these values are 
estimated with less error. However, we follow the previous literature and regress the scaled 
price difference by issue, Diff/Pold, on the dividend yield, D/Pold, where: 
 
∑
∑
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 In addition, we regress the unscaled price difference by issue Diff on the dividend D. 
 
Table 4 around here 
 
 Table 4 reports regression estimates of DVR for pre-1997 data, estimated from 
concurrent trades by issue and from ex-dividend day price changes. The DVR from concurrent 
trades is 0.82 if the price difference and dividend are scaled, which is not significantly below 
1.00, and 1.47 if they are unscaled, which is significantly above 1.00. The DVRs from the ex-
dividend method for the matched sample are 0.38 (scaled) and 0.98 (unscaled). For the 
unmatched sample, the marginal DVRs are 0.89 (scaled) and 0.75 (unscaled), and both these 
coefficients are significantly below one. It is noteworthy that the R2 values of the regressions 
using concurrent trades data are much higher than they are for the ex-dividend data. 
In analysing the residuals from the regressions it became evident that there were some 
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substantial outliers and departures from normality. Therefore the regression analyses for both 
concurrent trading data and ex-dividend data were repeated using robust regression.5 The 
corresponding DVR estimates using robust regression are larger across the board. So the 
outlier observations in dividend valuation regressions appear to depress the DVR. For the 
scaled robust regressions, the DVR estimate using concurrent trades data is 1.30, significantly 
above 1.00, compared with 0.93 for the matched ex-dividend sample and 0.97 for the 
unmatched sample, neither of which is significantly different from 1.00. For the unscaled 
robust regressions, the DVR estimate using concurrent trades data is 1.52, significantly above 
1.00, compared with 1.06 for the matched ex-dividend sample and 0.99 for the unmatched 
sample, neither of which is significantly different from 1.00.  
 The scaled and unscaled regressions give conflicting results with regard to the 
intercept. The intercept is expected to be negative if arbitrageurs are the marginal traders. It 
reflects the impact of transactions costs on the profitability of dividend arbitrage. Alternatively 
a negative coefficient could be due to the tick size effect. With one exception, the intercepts of 
the scaled regressions are not significantly different to zero, which is consistent with dividend 
values at the margin that are set by investors rather than by arbitrageurs. However, with one 
exception, all but one of the intercepts of the unscaled regressions are significantly negative. 
 In summary, the regression approach tends to support the earlier results (Tables 2 and 
3) that the concurrent trades method produces higher estimates of DVR than the ex-dividend 
method. The robust regressions also give consistently higher estimates for the DVR. This 
suggests that outliers consistently cause a downward bias in DVR estimates. The concurrent 
trades and robust regression results give estimates of the DVR that are either significantly 
greater than one, or not significantly different from one, whereas the OLS estimates from the 
unmatched ex-dividend data are significantly less than one. 
 
                                                          
5 The purpose of robust regression is to fit a model where the estimates are resistant to the 
effect of outliers. The type of robust regression we use is known as an M-estimator since it is 
related to maximum likelihood estimation. The method works by reweighting the observations 
associated with outliers. The extent of the re-weighting is determined by an influence 
function. In this study Andrew’s sine influence function was used. 
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(iii) Regression results including post-1997 data 
Table 5 presents the results of extending our analysis in Table 4 by adding the post-1997 data. 
To test whether the post-1997 period was accompanied by a change in dividend values, we 
incorporate intercept and slope dummies into the regressions. The intercept dummy takes the 
value zero for the pre-97 period and the value one thereafter. The slope dummy is formed as a 
multiplicative interaction term between the intercept dummy and the dividend variable, that is 
dividend yield (scaled regression) or dividend (unscaled regression). The change in the 
marginal DVR is measured by the coefficient on the slope interaction dummy.  
 
Table 5 around here 
 
 The results, both for the concurrent trades samples and the unmatched ex-dividend day 
samples, provide no consistent evidence of a fall in dividend valuation after July 1997. Across 
the twelve regressions in Table 5, eight of the slope interaction coefficients are not 
significantly different from zero, while the other four coefficients are negative and significant. 
Only one of the intercept dummies is significant and it is positive.  
 
 (iv) Relation between DVR and yield  
We have suggested that the tick size and bid-ask spread effects are less likely to matter in the 
concurrent trades method. If so, the evidence from concurrent trades should provide a 
relatively clear indication of the tax status of the investors or arbitrageurs setting prices at the 
margin. The Chu and Partington (2002) analysis and consideration of the ownership 
characteristics of UK equities suggest that tax-privileged institutions acting as investors are 
likely to determine dividend values in many cases. If so, there should be no relation between 
the DVR and dividend yield. Alternatively, if the institutions are acting as arbitrageurs rather 
than investors, there should be a positive relation between DVR and dividend yield, due to the 
costs of arbitrage. The magnitude of the DVR would depend on these arbitrage costs. The 
standard tax-clientele hypothesis also predicts a positive relation between DVR and yield, 
since high yield stocks will be held by low tax investors and vice versa. In addition, a positive 
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relation between the DVR and dividend yield is predicted by the tick effect, at least in ex-
dividend evidence. 
 
Table 6 around here 
  
Table 6 shows the mean DVRs for three samples, partitioned by dividend yield 
quintiles. The samples are the concurrent trades sample pre-1997 and the unmatched ex-
dividend sample pre-1997 and post-1997. It can be seen that there is no monotonic relation 
between the mean DVR per quintile and the mean yield. We have also run regressions, for 
each sample, of DVR on dividend yield. In none of the regressions (not reported) are the slope 
coefficients significantly different from zero, and all have R2 values of less than 0.02. The 
absence of a relationship between DVR and dividend yield is as predicted by the Chu-
Partington analysis, and is inconsistent with arbitrage trading, the tax-clientele effect, and the 
tick size effect. 
In studying the effect of the 1997 tax change, Bell and Jenkinson (2002) measure the 
dividend yield on a share using an estimate of the dividend for the full year, rather than using 
the interim or final dividend which is the dividend used in Table 6 and in other existing 
studies. They also estimate the DVR per quintile by the scaled regression method, rather than 
by the mean DVR for the quintile.  They do not find a monotonic relation between DVR and 
yield either, but they argue, nevertheless, that there is evidence for the existence of tax 
clienteles during their sample period (1995-99). They find that the fall in DVR after 1997 is 
the second-largest for the highest-yielding quintile, which, on the tax-clientele view, consists 
of the shares which are most likely to be owned by pension funds. We do not find this result in 
our unmatched ex-dividend samples. The lower-yielding quintiles have much larger falls in 
mean DVR than does the highest-yielding quintile. We infer that the ex-dividend evidence 
regarding the impact of the tax change in 1997 on dividend valuation is sensitive to the 
method of estimating a share’s dividend yield. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
Our comparison of the concurrent trades and ex-dividend methods of estimating 
dividend values indicates that they give significantly different results. The ex-dividend 
estimates are much noisier than the concurrent trades estimates, and they usually give lower 
values for the DVR, unless robust regression is used. Existing studies report mean DVRs 
which are significantly less than one for samples from before 1997. These findings have been 
somewhat puzzling, in the light of the ability of tax-exempt investors to reclaim advance 
corporation tax from 1973. With one exception, estimates of the DVR from the concurrent 
trades method exceed one and significantly so for most of the regression estimates. In contrast, 
with the exception of some robust regression results, the estimates of DVR from the ex-
dividend method are less than one. The DVR is particularly low in the ex-dividend sample 
which matches the sample used in the concurrent trades method. 
The finding of higher dividend values from the concurrent trades method suggests that 
estimates of the market value of dividends from ex-dividend day studies are biased 
downwards. The time gap of one day between observation of cum-dividend and ex-dividend 
prices leads to substantial noise in using the ex-dividend price drop as a measure of dividends. 
Noise and associated outliers would not be expected to lead to downward bias in the 
measurement of dividend values; however the results of the robust regression suggest that 
such bias is indeed the consequence of ex-dividend outliers. This is consistent with Davidson 
and Mallin (1989) who also obtain higher estimates of the DVR using the robust technique of 
least absolute deviation. We argue that most of the biases are alleviated by using the 
concurrent trades method. On the basis of our results we also suggest that researchers using 
ex-dividend data consider analysis of those data with robust regression. 
The evidence presented here, to some extent, supports the view that the market value 
of dividends is determined by tax-privileged institutions, which could reclaim some or all the 
ACT paid by companies. This explains the DVRs of more than one before 1997. However, we 
find little evidence of a significant drop in DVRs post 1997, for either the concurrent trades, 
or ex-dividend samples. The post-1997 concurrent trades sample only consists of 14 issues, 
but it has 1,252 observations of dividend values from pairs of trades. Because of the large 
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numbers of pairs of trades for many of the issues, and the low level of noise in the 
observations for a given share, the mean of the DVRs for some issues is estimated with low 
standard error. There are 8 issues after 1997 with a mean DVR which is more than two 
standard errors above 1.  
The ability to estimate the DVR from many observations per ex-dividend event is an 
advantage of the concurrent trades method. It is evident from examination of the individual 
issues that there is heterogeneity in DVR estimates across ex-dividend events both before and 
after 1997 (see Appendix). The heterogeneity of estimates for DVRs that have relatively low 
standard errors, implies that there is heterogeneity in the type of marginal trader who 
determines the market value of a given dividend for a given share. The type of trader could 
vary both by tax status, and by whether the trader is a long term investor or an arbitrageur.  
Unlike Bell and Jenkinson (2002), we find no evidence that tax clienteles affect 
dividend values. In both the concurrent trades and the ex-dividend samples our tests find no 
relation between DVRs and dividend yields. Also, we do not find that post-1997 the DVR 
falls most for the highest-yielding shares, although we do not measure yield in exactly the 
same way as Bell and Jenkinson. In addition, our evidence does not provide clear support for 
the hypotheses that dividend values are predominantly set by arbitrageurs, or are affected by 
the tick size. Our evidence suggests that the process by which equilibrium market values for 
dividends are determined is indeed ‘messy’, as implied by the analyses of Boyd and 
Jagannathan (1994, p. 723) and Chu and Partington (2002). There appears to be heterogeneity 
across dividend values in the identity of the marginal trader, and the heterogeneity does not 
seem to have a simple explanation. However, the bulk of our evidence supports the view that, 
on average, the market value of dividends was equal to, or greater than, the face value, both 
before and after 1997. 
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APPENDIX: CONCURRENT TRADES ESTIMATES OF DVR BY ISSUE 
 
 
Company name at time of 
issue 
Ex-
rights 
date 
Market 
capitalisation 
(£m)* 
Net 
dividend 
DVR Pairs of 
prices 
DVR 
standard 
error 
Pre-1997 sample       
AIM Group 01/08/89 46.4 6.60 0.81 7 0.42 
Airbreak Leisure Group 16/01/92 14.2 1.31 0.42 16 0.16 
Allied Leisure 23/02/93 21.8 1.00 0.00 3 0.00 
Amec 22/04/91 354.2 6.25 1.72 34 0.05 
Anglo United 11/06/91 94.5 1.40 0.68 11 0.14 
Argyll Group 21/05/91 2,914.3 5.85 1.50 170 0.01 
Asda Group 01/02/93 1,826.0 0.50 1.39 90 0.08 
Attwoods 28/03/91 323.6 3.25 1.14 12 0.11 
Baird 01/05/91 240.2 5.35 1.06 18 0.08 
Barry Wehmiller Intnl. 09/10/91 68.2 4.30 0.37 11 0.10 
Bass  28/03/91 3,557.9 9.90 1.80 494 0.02 
Beales Hunter  16/01/92 19.9 2.30 0.98 4 0.45 
Bespak  25/06/91 56.5 5.00 1.40 5 0.19 
Bowater  26/03/92 1,181.9 12.50 0.88 138 0.05 
British Polythene Industries  18/09/91 63.5 3.00 1.19 30 0.18 
British Vita  05/03/92 465.7 3.60 1.22 70 0.06 
Bullers  14/02/90 17.0 1.50 0.33 26 0.21 
Capital & Counties  27/08/91 360.0 5.00 0.81 8 0.15 
Cater Allen Holdings  18/06/90 81.4 19.13 1.41 9 0.16 
Concentric  17/05/89 57.6 3.54 0.51 13 0.19 
Cookson Group  08/03/93 952.1 3.00 1.61 111 0.04 
Dart Group  01/07/91 15.6 1.80 0.00 1  
ECC Group  26/02/92 1,101.1 13.40 1.33 247 0.02 
Ellis & Everard  17/05/90 114.8 4.80 1.87 33 0.17 
EMAP  10/06/92 395.2 5.50 1.55 23 0.11 
Epwin Group  25/03/92 28.7 4.50 1.11 1  
First Leisure Corporation  19/07/90 297.0 1.55 0.79 59 0.18 
Gardiner Group  21/06/91 54.9 0.47 0.38 6 0.71 
Granada Group  04/06/91 626.0 2.50 1.10 189 0.05 
Hampden Homecare  20/03/89 9.0 1.50 1.33 1  
Heywood Williams Group  07/03/91 171.4 8.00 1.32 16 0.07 
Hillsdown Holdings  27/09/91 1,398.4 2.20 –0.21 109 0.11 
Howden Group  01/03/93 137.2 0.75 2.73 61 0.26 
J Bibby & Sons  10/05/91 184.5 2.85 0.91 14 0.21 
Ladbroke Group  17/09/91 2,366.6 4.92 1.28 287 0.03 
Laird Group  15/04/92 96.8 6.20 1.25 39 0.05 
Lamont Holdings  12/05/92 83.9 8.50 1.46 24 0.08 
Marshalls  10/06/92 90.2 3.75 1.03 8 0.23 
Merchant Retail Group  07/06/91 27.2 1.30 1.01 29 0.10 
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Company name at time of 
issue 
Ex-
rights 
date 
Market 
capitalisation 
(£m)* 
Net 
dividend 
DVR Pairs of 
prices 
DVR 
standard 
error 
       
Morgan Crucible Co  17/04/91 457.6 6.75 1.32 66 0.06 
Northern Foods  09/12/91 1,144.3 6.85 1.58 54 0.04 
Ocean Group  11/04/91 447.8 9.53 1.54 20 0.06 
Pendragon  23/03/93 87.1 4.40 1.55 12 0.11 
Pentos  17/08/90 109.6 0.60 1.11 7 1.31 
Pepe 11/07/89 84.6 4.00 0.74 4 0.51 
Porvair  20/02/92 17.3 2.20 0.91 3 0.00 
PWS Holdings  08/05/90 16.1 1.30 0.42 12 0.30 
Redland  26/03/91 1,779.7 16.75 1.52 244 0.01 
Resort Hotels  01/05/92 55.7 2.25 1.20 103 0.06 
Sage Group  28/03/91 43.3 2.70 1.48 13 0.30 
Scapa Group  23/05/91 283.7 3.76 0.74 18 0.10 
Senior Engineering Group  17/02/92 136.3 1.95 1.38 53 0.09 
Simon Engineering  29/03/90 238.0 11.00 1.48 52 0.03 
Sims Food Group  11/11/91 84.0 3.00 1.20 7 0.45 
Tootal  11/04/88 265.8 2.80 0.26 52 0.06 
Westbury  16/05/88 88.8 3.75 1.12 11 0.20 
Whitecroft  24/06/91 61.2 5.40 0.22 8 0.08 
Wm Low  16/11/90 139.5 5.25 1.08 8 0.08 
WYKO Group  17/07/89 17.8 2.00 1.17 3 0.44 
       
Post-1997 sample       
Albermarle & Bond 18/09/98 25.8 0.75 1.77 5 0.77 
Davis 09/04/02 646.2 11.25 1.50 39 0.06 
Dyson 08/04/02 37.4 4.65 1.14 107 0.03 
Enterprise 24/05/02 785.4 4.70 1.71 21 0.14 
Eurodis Electron 04/09/00 110.5 2.50 1.06 33 0.09 
Highbury House Comms 02/02/00 88.5 0.30 2.90 330 0.15 
Imperial Tobacco 09/04/02 4,743.6 12.00 1.12 206 0.01 
LA Fitness 27/09/00 109.2 0.33 –0.74 14 2.45 
Lavendon 14/03/01 161.7 4.35 1.10 19 0.01 
Logica 04/10/00 9,386.7 1.90 6.30 206 0.70 
Marylebone Warwick B. 1 26/11/99 80.9 1.40 2.94 83 0.20 
Marylebone Warwick B. 2 03/11/00 184.9 1.40 0.81 75 0.20 
Pearson 28/07/00 12,601.9 9.20 0.17 18 0.13 
Pressac 22/07/98 136.5 3.52 0.17 96 0.98 
 
* As at the day before the announcement of the rights issues. 
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Table 1 
 
Value after tax of dividends during period 6 April 1988 to 5 April 1993 
 
 Value after tax of £1 of net dividends 
 
 Ignoring Assuming CGT 
 CGT1 is paid at the 
Investor  maximum rate2 
 
Higher rate individual              £0.80 £1.33 
Basic rate individual £1.00 £1.33 
Corporate shareholder £1.00 £1.54 
Life assurance fund £1.00 to £1.33 £1.67 to £2.22 
Pension fund, charity, other tax-exempt investor £1.33 £1.33 
Foreign investing institution  £1.00 to £1.07 £1.00 to £1.07 
 
Notes 
 
1. Value after tax ignoring CGT is (1 − TI)/(1 − TACT), where TI is the income tax rate of the 
investor and TACT is the advance corporation tax rate, which was 25% during 1988-93. Higher 
rate TI was 40%, basic rate TI was 20%. Dividends received by companies were not taxed 
twice: UK resident companies could use their tax credits to eliminate their own liability to 
ACT. Life funds could reclaim some or all of ACT, the amount depending on fund-specific 
circumstances. Exempt investors could reclaim all of ACT. Some foreign investors could 
reclaim some of ACT (the £1.07 figure is from Bell and Jenkinson, 2002).   
 
2. Value after tax allowing for CGT is (1 − TI)/(1 − TACT)(1 − TG), where TG is the maximum 
CGT rate for the relevant category of investor, ignoring provisions which reduce CGT 
payable. TI  = TG for individuals from 1988. Companies pay corporation tax on chargeable 
gains; the full rate of corporation tax was 35% in 1988-90, 34% in 1990-91 and 33% in 1991-
93. Life funds pay CGT on chargeable gains net of any expenses which can be set against 
chargeable gains. The CGT rate for life funds was 30% in 1988-89 and 40% in 1989-93. Tax-
exempt investors paid no CGT and we assume that foreign investors paid no UK CGT. 
  
Sources: Inland Revenue Statistics; MacLeod and Levitt (1999). 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics for concurrent trades and ex-dividend data 
 
Estimates of the dividend valuation ratio (DVR) are given by Diff/D for concurrent trades by 
issue, Difft/D for concurrent trades by trade, and (Pcum – Pex)/D for the ex-dividend method. D 
is the dividend value net of advance corporation tax; Difft is the difference in value between 
the old and the new shares following a rights issue for hour t; Diff is the mean of Difft for a 
given issue; Pcum is the price of the old share at the close of the day before the ex-dividend 
day; Pex is the price at the close of the ex-day. Dividend yield is calculated as at the day before 
the ex-day. 
 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Mean Median Std dev Min Max 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Panel A: 1988-93 
 
Concurrent trades and matched ex-dividend sample 
 
Dividend (pence) 4.66 3.75 3.86 0.47 19.13 
Dividend yield (%) 2.11 1.92 1.04 0.59 5.17 
 
Concurrent trades by issue (N = 59)  
DVR 1.08 1.16 0.53 –0.19 2.72 
 
Concurrent trades by trade (N = 2551) 
DVR 1.25 1.38 0.85 –4.51 10.67 
 
Ex-dividend method (N = 59)  
DVR 0.43 0.42 2.07 –3.64 12.50 
 
Unmatched ex-dividend sample (N =4046) 
 
Dividend (pence) 5.14 3.80 5.33 0.05 98.00 
Dividend yield (%) 1.79 1.60 0.99 0.03 7.55 
DVR 0.91 0.88 5.51 –50.00 308.82
  
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 2 cont. 
 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Mean Median Std dev Min Max 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Panel B: 1998-2004 
 
Concurrent trades and matched ex-dividend sample 
 
Dividend (pence) 4.16 3.01 3.94 0.30 12.00 
Dividend yield (%) 1.05 0.90 0.75 0.12 2.55 
 
Concurrent trade by issue (N = 14)  
DVR 1.61 1.13 1.65 -0.74 6.30 
 
Concurrent trade by trade (N = 1252) 
DVR 2.51 1.31 5.00 –33.26 58.26 
 
Ex-dividend method (N = 14)  
DVR 0.24 1.04 6.68 –11.05 14.64 
 
Unmatched ex-dividend sample (N = 1814) 
 
Dividend (pence) 5.48 4.00 5.45 0.01 71.00 
Dividend yield (%) 1.57 1.30 1.35 0.05 36.59 
DVR  0.60 0.86 6.26 –69.74 113.70 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 3 
Hypothesis tests comparing the DVR for the concurrent trades and ex-dividend methods  
 
Null Hypothesis 
 
Panel A 
1988-93 
 
 
t-statistic 
 
 
Probability 
Probability 
(Wilcoxon 
rank sum) 
DVR (concurrent trades) = 1 1.17 0.25 0.16 
DVR (matched ex-div) = 1 –2.12 0.04 <0.01 
DVR (unmatched ex-div) = 1 –1.04 0.30 <0.01 
1997-2004    
DVR (concurrent trades) = 1 1.39 0.19 0.21 
DVR (matched ex-div) = 1 –0.43 0.68 1.00 
DVR (unmatched ex-div) = 1 –2.70 <0.01 <0.01 
 
 
Panel B 
1988-1993 
 
 
  
Probability 
(Mann 
Whitney) 
DVR (concurrent trades) 
 = DVR (matched ex-div)  
2.35 0.02 <0.01 
DVR (concurrent trades) 
 = DVR (unmatched ex-div) 
1.54 0.12 <0.01 
DVR (matched ex-div) 
 = DVR (unmatched ex-div) 
1.70 0.09 <0.01 
1997-2004    
DVR (concurrent trades) 
 = DVR (matched ex-div)  
0.75 0.47 0.51 
DVR (concurrent trades) 
 = DVR (unmatched ex-div) 
2.17 0.05 0.06 
DVR (matched ex-div) 
 = DVR (unmatched ex-div) 
–0.20 0.84 0.76 
 
Panel C 
1988-2004 
   
DVR pre-97 = DVR post-97 
(concurrent trades) 
1.19 0.26 0.38 
DVR pre-97 = DVR post-97 
(matched ex-div) 
–0.11 0.92 0.28 
DVR pre-97 = DVR post-97 
(unmatched ex-div) 
1.80 0.07 0.79 
 
Note 
Hypothesis tests involving concurrent trades are all based on data by issue. Data by individual 
trades is not used as it is debateable whether the DVR observations by individual concurrent 
trades are independent.  
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Table 4 
Estimates of DVR from regression analysis for 1988-93 
 
The first six regressions are scaled regressions: µ(Diff/Pold)i  =  α + βµ(D/Pold)i + ei and (Pcum,i – Pex,i)/Pcum,i  =  α + βDi/Pcum,i + ei, where i labels a dividend event, and 
µ(Diff/Pold)i and µ(D/Pold)i are the mean values of Difft/Poldt and D/Poldt for event i. The second six regressions are unscaled: Diffi  =  α + βDi + ei and Pcum,i – Pex,i  =  α + βDi + 
ei. The marginal DVR estimate is the coefficient on dividend yield (scaled) or dividend (unscaled). Standard errors are given in parentheses below the coefficients. For the intercept, * 
(**) indicates coefficients significantly different from zero at the 5% (1%) level. For the slope, @ (@@) indicates coefficients significantly different from one at the 5%  (1%) level. 
All slope coefficients are significantly different from zero (at the 5% level or better) with the exception of the coefficients shown in italics. Coefficients reported in the table as 
significant, but shown as zero value, do have non-zero values but rounding to two decimal places reduces them to zero. 
 
Dependent 
variable 
Diffi/Poldi  (Pcum,i – Pex,i)/Pcum,i (Pcum,i – Pex,i)/Pcum,i Diffi Pcum,i – Pex,i Pcum,i – Pex,i 
 Concurrent trades data Matched ex-dividend 
data 
Unmatched ex-dividend 
data 
Concurrent trades data Matched ex-dividend 
data 
Unmatched ex-
dividend data 
Regression  OLS Robust OLS Robust OLS Robust OLS Robust OLS Robust OLS Robust 
 
Intercept 
 
0.00 
(0.00) 
 
–0.00 
(0.00) 
 
0.00 
(0.01) 
 
–0.00 
(0.01) 
 
–0.00 
(0.00) 
 
–0.00** 
(0.00) 
 
–1.22** 
(0.38) 
 
–1.17** 
(0.25) 
 
–2.14** 
(0.98) 
 
–2.47** 
(0.76) 
 
0.42** 
(0.16) 
 
-0.41** 
(0.05) 
Slope for 
dividend 
yield 
 
0.82 
(0.15) 
 
1.30@@ 
 (0.14) 
 
0.38 
(0.35) 
 
0.93 
(0.30) 
 
0.89@@ 
(0.03) 
 
0.97 
(0.02) 
      
 
Slope for 
dividend 
       
1.47@@ 
(0.06) 
 
1.52@@ 
(0.04) 
 
0.98 
(0.16) 
 
1.19 
(0.14) 
 
0.75@@ 
(0.02) 
 
0.99 
(0.01) 
 
R2 
 
0.33 
 
0.67 
 
0.02 
 
0.14 
 
0.16 
 
0.48 
 
0.91 
 
0.96 
 
0.39 
 
0.58 
 
0.22 
 
0.70 
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Table 5 
Change in DVR after 1997 
 
The regressions of Table 4 have been extended by including data for the post-97 samples and adding an intercept dummy and a slope interaction dummy. For example, the unscaled 
concurrent trades regression is Diffi  =  α + β1Di + β2δ i + β3δ iDi + ei; δ i takes the values of 0 for pre-97 data and 1 for post-97 data. The change in DVR post 97 is measured by the 
coefficient for the slope interaction dummy. For the intercept, intercept dummy, and slope interaction, * (**) indicates coefficients significantly different from zero at the 5% (1%) 
level. For the slope on dividend yield and dividends, @ (@@) indicates coefficients significantly different from one at the 5%  (1%) level. All slope coefficients on dividend yield 
and dividends are significantly different from zero (at the 5% level or better) with the exception of the coefficient shown in italics.  
 
Dependent 
variable 
Diffi/Poldi  (Pcum,i – Pex,i)/Pcum,i (Pcum,i – Pex,i)/Pcum,i Diffi Pcum,i – Pex,i Pcum,i – Pex,i 
 Concurrent trades data Matched ex-dividend 
data 
Unmatched ex-dividend 
data 
Concurrent trades data Matched ex-dividend 
data 
Unmatched ex-dividend 
data 
Regression  OLS Robust  OLS Robust  OLS Robust  OLS Robust  OLS Robust  OLS Robust  
 
Intercept 
 
0.00 
(0.00) 
 
–0.00 
(0.00) 
 
–0.00 
(0.01) 
 
–0.00 
(0.01) 
 
–0.00 
(0.00) 
 
–0.00** 
(0.00) 
 
–1.22** 
(0.49) 
 
–1.18** 
(0.06) 
 
–2.14 
(2.69) 
 
–2.42** 
(0.75) 
 
0.42* 
(0.21) 
 
–0.41** 
(0.06) 
Slope for 
Dividend 
yield 
 
0.82 
(0.15) 
 
1.30@@ 
(0.11) 
 
0.38 
(0.36) 
 
1.18 
(0.29) 
 
0.89@@ 
(0.03) 
 
0.97 
(0.02) 
      
 
Slope for 
Dividend 
       
1.47@@ 
(0.08) 
 
1.52@@ 
(0.04) 
 
0.98 
(0.45) 
 
1.17 
(0.14) 
 
0.75@@ 
(0.03) 
 
0.99 
(0.01) 
 
Intercept 
dummy 
 
–0.01 
(0.01) 
 
0.00 
(0.00) 
 
–0.01 
(0.02) 
 
–0.01 
(0.01) 
 
–0.00 
(0.00) 
 
0.00 
(0.00) 
 
2.72* 
(1.06) 
 
1.20 
(0.56) 
 
4.14 
(5.86) 
 
 
2.83 
(2.25) 
 
–0.66 
(0.42) 
 
0.05 
(0.11) 
Slope 
interaction: 
dummy × 
div yield 
 
0.33 
(0.45) 
 
–0.14 
(0.29) 
 
2.00 
(1.17) 
 
1.72 
(0.87) 
 
0.04 
(0.05) 
 
–0.06* 
(0.03) 
      
Slope 
interaction: 
dummy × 
dividend  
       
–0.55** 
(0.19) 
 
–0.28* 
(0.10) 
 
–2.13* 
(1.02) 
 
–0.22 
(0.37) 
 
 
0.05 
(0.05) 
 
–0.01 
(0.02) 
 
R2 
 
0.41 
 
0.70 
 
0.04 
 
0.27 
 
0.18 
 
0.49 
 
0.83 
 
0.95 
 
0.07 
 
0.53 
 
0.13 
 
0.71 
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Table 6 
Relation between DVR and dividend yield 
 
 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Yield quintile 1 2 3 4 5 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Concurrent trades: 1988-93 
Mean yield 0.96% 1.57% 2.02% 2.65% 3.59% 
Mean DVR 1.07 1.10 1.06 1.10 1.03 
Median DVR 1.07 1.10 1.21 1.23 1.14 
Number of observations 12 12 12 12 11 
 
Unmatched ex-dividend: 1988-93 
Mean yield 0.65% 1.17% 1.61% 2.18% 3.32% 
Mean DVR 1.36 0.72 0.79 0.79 0.89 
Median DVR 0.79 0.87 0.90 0.86 0.93 
Number of observations 809 809 809 809 810 
 
Unmatched ex-dividend: 1998-99 
Mean yield 0.41% 0.89% 1.32% 1.90% 1.93% 
Mean DVR 0.47 0.55 0.91 0.86 0.82 
Median DVR 1.06 0.83 0.92 0.84 0.88 
Number of observations 363 363 363 363 362 
 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
